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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUE LACY OLSEN 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. No. 17040 
REED J. OLSEN 
Defendant - Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff seeking a divorce from 
the Defendant. The District Court of Cache County granted 
Plaintiff a divorce and entered its judgment and decree of 
divorce which divided the property acquired by the parties 
during their marriage. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to sustain the Judgment and order of 
the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married. at Elko, 
Nevada on April 14, 1976. 
No children have been born as a result of this marriage. 
Each of the parties are middle-age individuals, having acquired 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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property prior to their marriage from other sources. During 
their marriage, the parties each contributed, in varying degrees 
income towards the support of the family unit. 
The Plaintiff filed this action for divorce on September 1, 
1978 and a chronology of the divorce proceeding is as follows~ 
a. September 1, 1978, Plaintiff files divorce. 
b. Defendant served with Summons, September 1, 1978. 
c. Court issues Order to Show Cause, September 1, 1978. 
d. September 10, 1978, attempted reconciliation between 
the parties. 
e. February 22, 1979, Plaintiff filed a Motion and 
Affidavit for Order to Show Cause and Restraining Order. 
f. March 19, 1979, District Court enters temporary 
restraining order. 
g. April 1, 1979, attempted second reconciliation. 
h. August 21, 1979, second reconciliation fails. 
i. October 2, 1979, Plaintiff forwards Interrogatories to 
Defendant. 
j. October 17, 1979, Plaintiff forwards Notice of 
Readiness for Trial to the Defendant. 
k. November , 1979, Plaintiff filed an affidavit and 
Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, set case for trial 
and award attorney's fees. Court issues Order to Show Cause to 
Defendant's attorney. 
-2-
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1. December 6, 1979, Defendant files answers to 
interrogatories. 
m. December, 1979, Plaintiff makes second request for 
trial setting. 
n. December 19, 1979, Court sets trial for March 7, 1980 
as a Second setting, August 26, 1980 as a First setting. 
o. February 21, 1980, Plaintiff answers Defendants 
interrogatories. 
p. February 29, 1980, the Court advises Defendant, case 
will be tried on March 7, 1980. 
q. March 5, 1980, Defendant moves for a continuance 
hearing March 5, 1980. Case continued until March 13, 1980. 
R. Trial March 13, 1980. 
Plaintiff proceeded at the time of trial for hearing in 
this matter without the Defendant filing an answer. The Court 
heard evidence from Plaintiff relating to grounds and evidence 
from both parties relating to the division of the property. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce 
were submitted to the Court and the Court on the 26th day of 
March, 1980, after amending the decree, entered the Decree of 
Divorce. 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT IS IN ERROR IN STATING THAT DEFENDANT HAS A 
-3-
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RIGHT TO HAVE A FULL AND COMPLETE HEARING INCLUDING A CONTEST AS 
TO THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE, EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
FILE AN ANSWER OR COUNTERCLAIM IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER. 
The transcript of proceedings commencing at page 46 shows 
at line 11 an objection by Plaintiff's counsel as to questions 
concerning grounds for divorce. The Court indicates at line 13 
that there is no answer filed in the case and in response 
thereto the counsel for the Defendant indicates that the filing 
of an answer has been waived and the following colloquy between 
Court and counsel occurred. (See T47) 
The Court: You really haven't filed an answer and set 
up that he denies that she has been treated cruel. So 
what difference-does it make. Mr. Malouf: Well, I think 
he should be able to state his version of the allegations 
since she has made them. The Court: Well, had you filed 
an answer, denying the allegation saying that there is no 
grounds for divorce, then I would agree with you. Mr. 
Malouf: That's true. No answer has been filed. No answer 
has been demanded either. We say that Plaintiff has waived 
the right to insist on an answer being filed. The Court: 
Well the court hasn't waived the right and I see no reason 
to go into it. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
there shall be a complaint and an answer. 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a 
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an origi-
nal claim, counterclaim, cross claim or third party claim shall 
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
-4-
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the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
Rule 80 states as follows: "Averments in a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is required other than those as to 
the amount of damage are admitted when not denied in the respon-
sive pleading." "Averments in a pleading to which no responsive 
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided." An allegation in this matter claiming mental cruelty 
as found in paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint would appear to 
be the type of an allegation requiring an answer. Moore's 
Federal Practice, Volumne 2A page 1531 relating to Rule 7A sta-
tes as follows: 
"Rule 7A is patterned on but not identical with 
former Equity Rule 31. That rule did away with 
the necessity of a reply or of further pleadings 
after the answer was filed except that a reply 
was required to a set-off or counter claim. 
Rule 7A contemplates that in the normal situation 
of a claim and a defense, the pleading shall consist 
only of a complaint and an answer". 
Moore's Federal Practice, Volumne 2A Rule 8D (page 1875) 
states with respect to interpretation of Rule 8D as follows: 
"The pleadings which are required or permitted to 
be made are listed in Rule 7A, which has been dis-
cussed in Chaoter 7 Supra. It was there pointed 
out that an earlier jointer of issue was desirable 
and had been provided for by Rule; that in many 
cases pleadings would stop with the answer. Sub-
division D of this rule is to compliment Rule 7A. 
-5-
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For example, all averments of the complaint other 
than those as to the amount of damage, will stand 
unless the Defendant answers and even if the 
Defendant answers, averments not denied by him 
will stand admitted. If, in his answer, the 
Defendant pleads in affirmative defense such as 
the statute of limitations, the affirmative de-
fense will be taken as denied or avoided by the 
Defendant without a reply since under Rule 7A 
no reply is permitted to an affirmative defense." 
Divorce actions are probably the most commonly filed action 
in the District Courts of the State of Utah. It is the 
Defendant's position that by reason of the fact that a divorce 
is an equitable proceeding, no answer is required from the 
Defendant. The authorities cited above hold contrary to the 
position taken by the Defendant. To hold otherwise would not 
only jeopardize the status of every default divorce rendered in 
the State of Utah, but also question the validity of re-
marriages and the issue thereof. 
The position taken by the Defendant is not only untenable 
but unreasonable. 
Plaintiff's alternative prior to the trial of this matter, 
obviously, was to file a default and take a default judgment 
against the Defendant. Such a proceeding has its merits and also 
has its faults. The Plaintiff's dilemma was to attempt to get 
the matter before the court and resolved because the Defendant 
-6-
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had control of the assets of the parties and the Plaintiff was 
financially unable to meet her obligations, such as the car 
payments, and other household necessities. A resolution by 
trial or stipulation was imperative. Obtaining a default 
judgment, although expedient, has the problems of fostering 
motions to set aside the default, and delays in filing briefs 
and subsequent interlocutory appeals. The Plaintiff elected to 
proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible incurring 
along the way, only those attorney's fees which are reasonably 
necessary for the prosecution of the case and the determination 
of the case upon its merits. 
The Defendant cites the case of Barber vs. Calder, 522 P2d, 
700, Utah 1974 as authority for the proposition that courts 
should exercise discretion liberally in favor of giving the par-
ties an opportunity for a hearing. 
The facts of the Barber case are completely different from 
the facts of this case. The holding in that case should not be 
used as authority for the proposition in this case. The cita-
tion of the case by the Defendant adds nothing to this case by 
reason of the fact that the fact situation does not deal with 
answers to complaints but deals with the striking of an answer 
for failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and 
-7-
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affirms the trial court's decision in doing so denying the 
Defendant any right for a hearing. 
Notwithstanding the fact the Defendant failed to file an 
answer in the above entitled matter the Defendant was still 
afforded an opportunity to fully and completely investigate this 
case, discover any facts pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hire experts, and do any other act in furtherance of 
this case. The Defendant was afforded a complete hearing as 
evidenced by the transcript with the exception of grounds for 
divorce which consisted of a short plain statement by the 
Plaintiff as to why she desired a divorce. See Transcript Page 
5 line 18 - 25, Page 6 line 1 - 3, none of which was objected to 
by the Defendant. 
The Defendant could have filed an answer and litigated the 
grounds at any time before trial as he was never foreclosed from 
doing so by the Plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ACCEPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
UNSUPPORTED EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE ACQUIRED BY THE 
PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE AT $100,000.00. 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant acquired, during their 
-8-
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marriage, a house situated at 1155 East 50 south, Logan, Utah, 
which home was in a home show prior to the purchase by the 
parties. The Defendant made a contribution of $8,000.00 toward 
the purchase price of the house. (TR 9,10) 
Plaintiff testified that in her opinion the present esti-
mate of the value of the residence would be $100,000.00 (TR 
page 14, 15.) The Plaintiff then went on to justify her opinion 
by virtue of the valuation of the lot, the natural appreciation 
of homes, and improvements made to the real estate. The 
Plaintiff was asked the following question: 
"Now then, do you have a present estimate of the 
value of this residence?" She stated: " I would 
say $100,000.00." 
The case of State Road Commission vs. Johnson, 550 P2d, 
260, where the landowner was asked for his valuation of the pro-
perty and upon indicating its value, indicated that the property 
was his life's work and that his valuation was based upon what 
it was worth to him. This case must be distinguished from the 
present case in which the Plaintiff gave very definitive reasons 
for her valuation of the property as a market value rather than 
a value to her as a sentimental item. The Defendant, at page 96 
of the transcript, was asked by his attorney what he thought the 
value of the house to be, and the Defendant indicated that it 
-9-
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was $85,000.00. The Defendant then, at page 97 of the 
transcript, indicated that he thought both parties should get 
out of the house what they had put into the house and then 
divide the equity in proportion to their contribution. However, 
on page 109 of the transcript Defendant admits Plaintiff is 
owner of one-hald of the house. Essentially the Defendant gave 
testimony concerning his valuation of the property, yet now in 
Point II complains that the trial court erred in accepting the 
Plaintiff's unsupported estimate of the value of the house. The 
Defendant gave no other credible testimony which the court could 
have supported his opinion as to value, and in reading the com-
parison of Defendant's testimony to the Plaintiff's testimony, 
it is obvious that the Plaintiff's testimony is more credible by 
reason of the facts and details given by the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant cites the case of Anderson vs. State Farm Fire 
Insurance for the proposition that testimony of an owner as to 
value is not conclusive even if it is not contradicted. 
Defendant quotes from the case but fails to include the next 
paragraph which states as follows: 
"His testimony is to be given such weight and credibility 
as the trier of fact finds reasonable ~nder the cir-
cumstances. 
Then he further cites the case of Iverson vs. Iverson, 526 
-10-
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P2d 1127 for the proposition that notwithstanding equitable 
powers vested in the District Court, the Court cannot act 
arbitrarily or on supposition or conjecture as to fact. 
Plaintiff cannot argue with either case. 
The District Court took into consideration the various fac-
tors listed by the Plaintiff for the appreciation and value of 
the house and valued it at $100,000.00. The Trial Court 
returned to the Plaintiff her investment of $8,000.00 together 
with the sum of $7,000.00 as Plaintiff's share of the equity in 
the house. Such an award is a common daily practice of the 
Courts in divorce cases and certainly does not show an arbitrary 
act nor one made by supposition or conjecture as to the facts. 
The Defendant cites the case of Watson vs. Watson, 561 P2d 
1072 Utah 1977, in which the trial court erred in failing to 
take post judgment evidence as a result of a motion for a new 
trial by reason of the fact that Plaintiff claimed she was not 
entitled to properly make discovery as to the value of the 
indian jewelry because it was taken by the Defendant along with 
other personal papers. 
The Defendant in this case has always had the right to 
obtain for himself a valuation of the residence of the parties, 
and if there is fault in failing to obtain such an appraisal of 
-11-
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the residence, it must lie in this case with the Defendant. 
The cases cited by the Defendant do not meet the proposi-
tion the Defendant advances, other cases have, however, 
addressed this question. See Lahr vs. Lahr 478 P2d 551, New 
Mexico 1970, 
where the Court held as follows: 
1. In determining whether Findings of Fact are 
supported by substantial evidence, we resolve all 
disputed facts and indulge in all reasonable inferences 
in favor of a successful party and disregard inferences 
to the contrary. 
2. We presume the correctness of the judgment of the 
trial court who had the advantage of evaluating the 
demeanor of the parties and of the witnesses. 
3. Plaintiff acknowledges that and owner of property may 
always testify as to its value •.•.. This testimony alone 
constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial 
courts valuation at that figure. 
The valuation on its face is reasonable taking into con-
sideration the past two years of inflation and appreciation in 
the cost of building materials and labor. 
The Defendant also gave his valuation, however, the trial 
court elected to treat the Plaintiff as more credible and chose 
her testimony. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOCATING THE PERSONAL PR~ 
PERTY OF THE PARTIES AND THE DEBTS OF THE PARTIES. 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As stated by the New Mexico Court in the case of Lahr vs. 
Lahr, Supra, a decision of a trial court is not to be upset 
unless the decision was manifestly unjust, inequitable and an 
abuse of discretion warranting the Supreme Court to substitute 
its judgment therefore. The Defendant cites the case of Reed 
vs. Reed, Utah 594 P2d, 871, where the trial court awarded the 
wife - Plaintiff 90% of the assets of the parties. This was a 
marriage of long duration and the Supreme Court remanded the 
case back to the trial court stating, "if it appears that the 
decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation, that it 
will more likely lead to further difficulties and distress than 
to serve the desired objective, then a re-appraisal of the 
decree must be undertaken." Plaintiff does not disagree with 
the fact situation or the holding of the court. See also Cline 
vs. Cline, Utah 511, P2d, 1284, as cited by the Defendant. 
Each of those cases are pertinent only to their fact situation. 
The facts of this case are different. 
Exhibits 8 and 9 entered into evidence in the above entitled 
matter by the Plaintiff, is a list of the property acquired by the 
parties during their 2 year marriage and an allocation of that 
property. Each of the parties have had an opportunity to value 
the various assets and their valuation was attached thereto. The 
-13-
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trial court, in making a division of the property, used such 
valuation in making an equitable division of the property of the 
parties. 
With respect to the debts and obligations of the parties, 
the Defendant claims a contribution to the marriage of 
$60,523.88 to be substracted from this contribution is a contri-
bution of $28,118.26 for the house, leaving an approximate 
balance of $32,000.00 as the Defendant's alleged contribution 
during the course of their marriage in contrast to the $7,000.00 
contribution by the Plaintiff. 
The evidence reflects that the Plaintiff's only liquid 
assets at the time of the trial was $32.00 in her checking 
account. (See TR. page 121, line 25) She was employed at the 
time of the trial by General Implement Distributors in Salt Lake 
City, Utah (TR page 4) at a salary of approximately $600.00 per 
month. (TR page 115, line 5). 
Plaintiff did not have her own transportation to come to 
trial, and, therefore, came from Salt Lake to Logan in a 
borrowed car (TR page 8, line 9 - 12). Plaintiff gave up her 
only transportation to the Defendant by reason of the fact that 
it was to be repossessed by the bank inasmuch as Plaintiff 
couldn't maintain the payments. (TR page 18, line 22, 23) From 
-14-
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the foregoing, the Court could reasonably find that the 
Plaintiff did not have the ability to pay any debts and obliga-
tions or attorney's fees for her own representation. 
On the other hand, the outstanding debts and obligations as 
claimed by the Defendant are not, in fact, the debts and obliga-
tions incurred by the parties. Although it is conceded that 
there is evidence that some of the debts and obligations may 
have been incurred by the parties, however, those debts were, by 
in large, for the purchase of property in the Defendant's 
possession or debts or charge cards used by the Defendant after 
the separation. 
The debt through Forseys in the amount of $375.00 was for 
furniture the Defendant had in his living room (TR page 72). 
The debt to Federal Employees Credit Union was for a motorcycle 
in the Defendant's possession and it is curious to note that in 
the year since their separation, the debt has not been substan-
tially reduced by the Defendant. (TR 73, TR 74, TR 75, TR 109) 
Claiming the first mortgage loan payment on the house, 
since separation as a debt yet, the Defendant admits that he is 
living in the house and seeks to charge it as a joint debt or 
expense. However, the Defendant aoes concede at page 109 of the 
transcript that the Defendant lived in the house and complained 
-15-
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he is paying the mortgage balance on a home she is "one-half the 
owner of." 
Apparently, the Court felt the Defendant's concession was 
of some importance. 
With regards to the Visa account, the Defendant sought to 
have the Plaintiff pay half of the indebtedness claiming he had 
very accurate records at page 102 of the transcript. However, 
he could not detail to the Court, the balance of Visa, current 
charges since his separation, nor the amount of the account at 
the time of the separation. He did, however, concede that the 
Plaintiff paid $200.00 on the account stating at page 103 of the 
transcript, "I think $200.00, but I may be wrong." 
With respect to Master Charge, Defendant indicates he has 
paid $1,562.00 (Tr. 77) and that there remains a balance on the 
Master Charge of $1,524.00. No attempt is made on the part of 
the Defendant to determine the indebtedness on Master Charge by 
the parties during their marriage, the items purchased with the 
Master Charge for which he may or may not have received or which 
Plaintiff may or may not have received, but does concede at page 
103 of the transcript that the Plaintiff paid $450.00 in May of 
1979. 
-16-
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At page 103 of the transcript the Defendant was asked 
"Now that you 
fair thing to 
equally as of 
Yes. And how 
how much have 
separation. 
indicate what you want to do, the only 
do is divide the Master Charge and the Visa 
February, 1980, is that correct: Answer: 
much have you paid on the Master Charge or 
you charged to the Master Charge since your 
Answer: I have no idea". 
The ZCMI debt, Defendant wishes to divide of $153.42 is for 
furniture in his possession. (TR 79 - TR 85) 
A review of the record in an effort to determine from the 
Defendant's testimony the debts incurred by the parties and the 
property which relates to the debt, leaves the reader with the 
inescapable conclusion that from the evidence introduced by the 
Defendant, it is impossible to determine the outstanding debts 
and obligations attributable to the parties and the property 
which was purchased by that debt and obligation in the 
Plaintiff's possession. 
It appears that the trial court, taking into consideration 
the evidence introduced by the Defendant, allocated the property 
to the parties and the debts and obligations of the parties 
fairly and equitably. Had the Defendant clearly defined debts 
related to property in the Plaintiff's possession such as the 
automobile taken by the Plaintiff subject to the indebtedness 
thereon, it may have been possible for the court to allocate 
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debts to the Plaintiff which she had in her possession. 
However, the record leaves much to be desired by way of defini-
tion as it relates to the Defendant's claimed error of distri-
buting property to the Plaintiff and the bills to the Defendant. 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests and the party appealing therefrom has the burden of 
proving that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial err or that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or that such 
a serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. Pope vs. Pope, Utah 589 P2d, 752; English vs. 
English, Utah 565 P2d , 409; Hansen vs. Hansen, Utah 537 P2d 
491; Mitchell vs. Mitchell, Utah 527, P2d, 1359. The evidence 
in this case should be reviewed most favorable to the findings 
of the trial court. Stucki vs. Stucki, Utah 562, P2d, 240. 
Literally, hundreds of other cases could be cited for the 
propositions stated above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's principal contention as evidenced by his 
brief, is that the Court did not choose to believe his client as 
it relates to the value of the house, allocation of debts, and 
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the division of property. The record reflects the Defendant's 
inconsistancies and inaccuracies. 
The Defendant would like to have the Court consider the 
number of marriages of the Plaintiff and the fact that the 
Plaintiff, may in the future, inherit some property from her 
mother, none of which is pertinent to this case. On the other 
hand, the Plaintiff's testimony contains a statement as to the 
value of the house based upon a market value and the grounds for 
the making of the estimate of value. Plaintiff's evidence con-
tains an allocation of the property of the parties, (See 
Exhibits 8 and 9) which has a definiteness attached to it and 
in which the court could make a reasonable division of the 
property. Plaintiff essentially introduced no evidence as to 
indebtedness by reason of the fact that the Defendant, had at 
the time of the separation of the parties, removed into his 
possession the books and records of the parties making it 
impossible for the Plaintiff to introduce any evidence as to 
indebtedness. The record, as introduced by the Defendant leaves 
much to be desired in the way of accuracy, certainty, and 
clarity. 
The Defendant complains that he was not allowed to intro-
duce evidence as to grounds for divorce, yet the pleadings do 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not even reflect an answer filed by the Defendant. (TR 46, 47) 
The record further illustrates the Plaintiff's reason for not 
objecting to the absence of an answer filed and why a default 
was not filed. (TR page 99, lines 13 - 25) 
The Plaintiff's financial position at the time of trial was 
evidenced by the fact that she had lost her automobile because 
she could not pay the monthly payments and that she had a nomi-
nal sum of $32.00 in her checking account on December 5th. 
The tenor of the trial was established by the Defendant on 
re-cross examination of the Plaintiff when he asked as follows: 
Question: Isn't it true that you have your mother 
as a source of income. Answer: That's not true. 
The Plaintiff, at the time of the trial, had been denied 
payment of a $150.00 a month temporary support and, was unable 
to maintain current her debts and obligations particularly her 
automobile. She had no money to pay her attorney, she had inves~ 
her funds in the residence in which the Defendant was living. It 
was important to the Plaintiff that the Trial Court render a 
decision in the matter. This appeal has had the same effect upon 
Plaintiff's financial status, she has no return of her money, no 
attorney's fees to perfect the appeal, she has lost the car for 
a second time. The Plaintiff's only request is a resolution 
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of this case with attorney's fees and costs to be paid. 
The trial court correctly allocated the property and the 
debts between the parties taking into consideration the evidence 
introduced by the parties. 
DATED th~ day of 
ge W. Preston 
orney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief to the Defendant's attorney, Raymond N. 
Malouf, MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS, Logan, 
Utah 84321, on this;?j' 
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